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IN THE

DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THlt DISTRICT OP

Nnw

JHRSEY.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Petitioner,
versus
UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION AND oTHJ.tRS,
Defendants.

BRIEF FOR THE DEFENDANTS JOHN 0. ROCKEFELLER
AND JOHN 0. ROCKEFELLER, JUNIOR.

MURRAY, PRENTICE & HOWLAND,
Solicitors for Defendants Rockefeller,
37 WALL STRJtltT,

New York.

STOR.
r-

~E WELWOOD MURRAY,
Of Counsel.

C. G. Bcnu1<>nm, 72

to ,a Spring Street, New York.
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IN THE

DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY.

UNITED STATES OF AMERIOA,
Petiti0ner,
VERSUS

No. 6214.

u NITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION and others,
Defendants.

Brief for the Defendants John D. Rockefeller
and John D. Rockefeller, Junior.

. 'fhis is a suit ~in equity brought by the United
States against the United States Steel Corporation, a
large number of " constituent" companies of the Steel
Corporation, and certain individuals. It is brought
under Section 4 of the so-called "Sherman Anti-Trust
Law" and is intended to bring ab0ut a dissoluti0n or
disintegration of the -Steel Corp0ration.
The main question in the case as a wh0le relates to
the Steel Corporation itself. It is unnecessary in this
brief to set forth or to discuss the multitudinous £acts
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charged in the petition or appearing in evidence as related to that main question. We are here concerned
solely with the defendants R@ckefeller.
The defendants Rockefeller were made parties in
0rder that the Government might secure against them
the relief provided for in the statute, that is, t@ prevent and restrain any · c0ntract, combination, or conspiracy by them in re~traint of commerce, interstate or
foreign, or monopolization by them of such trade or
c0mmerce, c0nnected with or relating to the United
State!'! Steel C0rporation or its 0perations. The only
relief against the defendants Rockefeller asked for in
the Government brief is that they be perpetually enjoined £ram doing any act in pursuance of or for the
purpose of carrying 0ut any of the unlawful combinati@ns referred to.
There is no evidence that the defendants Rockefeller, at the time when suit was brought, were violating @r threatening to violate the statute; on the
contrary by direct stipulation with the Government it
is in evidence that the defendants Rockefeller were
n0t violating the statute 0r threatening to vi@late it
and that they are not now violating or threatening to
violate it; indeed, it is stipulated that at the time the
petition was filed they had had no relation of management or contral to the Corporation for at least a year
and a half. The evidence shows that the defendants
Rockefeller to0k n@ part in the promotion of the Steel
Corporation, and that they have not violated the statute
at any time. Their conduct and their attitude toward
the Steel Corporation at the time the petition was
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filed could not be more m accordance with the requirements of the statute both in its letter and in its
spirit.
The issuance of an injunction under such circumstances is not warranted by the statute nor is it in
accordance with the practice of courts of equity. An
injunction as against these defendants should be refused and as against them, the suit should be dismissed.
Statement of Facts Relating to the Defendants
John D. Rockefeller and John D. Rockefeller, Junior.

(a) The pleadings. The petition charges that in
February, 1901, the Steel Corporation was formed
and incorporated and effected a consolidation of the
Federal Steel Company, the Carnegie Company, the
National Tube Company, the American Steel and
Wire Company, the National Steel Company, the
American Tin Plate Company, the American Steel
Hoop Company, and the American _Sheet Steel Company. The petition also charges, under the bead of
"Acquisitions subsequent to the original combination," that the Steel Corporation in April, 1901, acquired the stock of the company known as Lake
Superior Consolidated Iron Mines and of the Bessemer Steamship Company (Petition, pp. 25, 26). Further, as a conclusion on the part of the pleader, the
petition charges that the Steel Corporation and the
several companies combining in Febrnary, 1901, and
the Steel Corporation and the individual defendants
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in the subsequent acquisition and control of Lake
Superior Consolidated Iron Mines and other c@mpanies named, in what they did, as charged, entered
into an agreement ~r combination in restraint of trade
and commerce among the several states and with
foreign nati0ns within the meaning of Section 1, and a
combination to monopolize a part of the trade or commerce among the several States and with foreign nations, within the meaning of Section 2 of the AntiTrust Act.
In the petition much space is occupied with charges
with respect to pools, agreements and combinations of
other sorts, and a general charge is made that "by
the af@resaid po@ls, agreements, meetings and acts the
Corporation, the said several companies and individual
defendants, in additi0n t0 the several unlawful
agreements and combinations by which all of the
companies and properties af@resaid were brought
under one control, have combined or conspired in restraint of trade and commerce among the several states
and with foreign nations within the meaning of Section 1, and to monopolize a part of the trade or commerce among · the several states and with foreign
nations within the meaning of Section 2, of the Antitrust Act." But the defendants Rockefeller are not
named nor is any act of theirs mentioned in connection with any such charges, alleged pools, agreements
or other combinations.
The sole statement of fact in the petition with respect
to the defendants Rockefeller relates t0 the sale 0f the
stock of Lake Superior Consolidated Iron Mines and
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of Bessemer Steamship Company to the Steel Corporation subsequent to the original combination (pp. 18,
25, 26), and charges that the defendants Rockefeller
were largely interested in the Lake Superior Consolidated Iron Mines, and that " both of them participated
in bringing about the combination and became members of the first Board of Directors of the Corporation."
The essential prayers of the petition, so far as concerns these defendants, are for a decree that the combinations described are unlawful, and that all acts
done or to be done to carry out the same are in
violation of the Anti-Trust Act; that the defendants
be perpetually enjoined from doing any act in pursuance of or for the purpose of carrying out the same ;
that the Steel Corporation " and all of the elements
composing it" be decreed to be illegal and in restraint
of trade, and that the Corporation be dissolved; that
each of the constituent companies be decreed to
have been combined in restraint of trade and illegal
and that each be dissolved; that it be decreed that
the several individual defendants combined with
other persons to restrain trade, and that each of
them be enjoined from continuing to carry out the
purposes of said combinations and, finally, that the
defendants, enumerating them, and here including the
defendants J. D. Rockefeller and J. D. Rockefeller,
Junior, be permanently enjoined as before prayed.
At the close of the case the Government, in its brief
(Part II., pp. 403, 404), modifies its claim; it now
makes no demand that Lake Superior Consolidated
Iron Mines be condemned as itself a combination in
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restraint of trade. The decree now sought for would
be aimed at the Steel Corporation itself and would
bring in the defendants Rockefeller only to perpetually enjoin them fr@m doing any act in pursuance
of er for the purpase of carrying out any unlawful combination related to the Steel Corporation
itself.
The defendants Rockefeller might have demurred.
They preferred, as was their right, to introduce verified answers reviewing their whole relation to the subject matter in controversy. But in these answers they
also pleaded that they were not proper parties (Article
Fourth of each answer).
(b) The proofs. It has appeared in proof that the
company known as Lake Superior Consolidated Iron
Mines (in which defendant J. D. Rockefeller had
a 25/29ths interest) owned a considerable group of
iron ore properties in the State of Minnesota ; that
the company owned the stock of the Duluth, Missabe
and N@rthern Railway, a mining road extending from
Duluth into the Missabe mining region, and that the
defendant J. D. Rockefeller owned the stock of the
Bessemer Steamship Company, which owned a :fleet
of ore carrying vessels on the Great Lakes. Something is said in the proofs and more in the Government brief @f events tending to show that prior to
the organization of the Steel Corporation this Mining
Company purchased a large amount of ore property
on the MissaLe Range in Minnesota, and hinting at
relations 0f the Company with other companies having interests on the Missabe Range.
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After the Steel Corporation was formed and the c0mbination made, if combination there was, the promoters
of the Steel Corporation, through Mr. J. P. Morgan,
opened a negotiation with Mr. J. D. Rockefeller for the
purchase from him of his interest in the Lake Superior
Cons@lidated Iron Mines and the Bessemer Steamship
Company. There is no assertian that these purchases
were included in the original scheme for the organization of the Steel Corporation. The petition (pp.
17-23) states the properties included in the Plan and
mentions the acquisition of Lake Superior Consolidated Iron Mines and Bessemer Steamship Company
only under the head of "Acquisitions subsequent ta
the original combination" (Petition, pp. 25, 26), and
nothing further is the present claim of the Government (Government brief, Part I., pp. 373, 374). To
the same effect is the evidence (Testimony of E. H.
Gary, Record, pp. 4747 and 4748; Testimony of
Robert Bacon, p. 5526). The circular of April 2,
1901, of J. P. M0rgan & Co. making the offer to
stockholders of Lake Superior Consolidated Iron
Mines refers to the organization of the Steel Corporation as already complete ; it states that the Morgan
circular of March 2, 1901 (which had not included
the Rockefeller properties), " having been accepted
by more than ninety-eight per cent. of the holders of
stock in the several companies therein mentioned, the
Plan proposed in said circular has become operative"
(Defendants' Exhibits, Vol. II., pp. 224). It was
after the completion of the original scheme, and after
Judge Gary had mentioned the matter to Mr. Morgan
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_a second time, that Mr. Morgan called on Mr. Rockefeller and that a negotiation was opened which was
followed up by Mr. Frick 0n behalf of the Steel Corporation, and which later resulted in the purchase by
the Steel Corporation of the Rockefeller ore and vessel
properties (Testimony of Gary, Record, pp. 4747 and
4748).
The essential facts with respect to the relation of
the defendants Rockefeller to the Steel Corporation
are set forth in two stipulations between the Government and defendants Rockefeller ; the first of these,
dated February 28, 1913, is found in the Record, Vol.
IX., at page 3688; the second of them, dated February 6, 1914, is found in the Record, Vol. XXVIII.,
at page 12059. As these two stipulations contain
nearly everything that relates to the defendants
Rockefeller in the whole of this voluminous record~
they are for convenience printed in full as an appendix to this brief.
From the first stipulation and the petiti@n it appears
that the defendant J. D. Rockefeller, owning all of
the stock of the Bessemer Steamship Company and
twenty-five-twenty-ninths of the stock of the Lake
Superior Consolidated Iron Mines, sold the Bessemer
Company for $8,500,000 cash (Government Petition, p.
26, where it is stated-" Its properties were acquired
in 1901 by the Corporation for $8,500,000 in cash")
and bis Lake Superior Company's stock on the basis
of $48,000,000 for the total stack of that company;
that after the agreement of sale had been made it was
arranged between Mr. Rockefeller and J. P. Morgan
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& Company acting for the Steel Corporation that the
price paid for Mr. R@ckefeller's st@ck would be paid
and discharged by delivering to him stock of the
Steel Corporation on the following basis : For each
share of Lake Superior Company's stock 1.35 shares of
preferred stock of the Steel Corporation, and 1.35 shares
of common stock of the Steel Corporation, and that at
that time the market price in New York for Steel
Corporation stock was eighty-three per cent. for preferred and thirty-eight per cent. for common.
This was the whole of the original transaction between the defendant J. D. Rockefeller and the Steel
Corporation. He sold and it bought certain property.
The price was bargained for in dollars; it was paid
partly in , cash and, by subsequent agreement, partly
in stock of the Steel Corporation taken at current
market quotations. Thus far in this narrative the defendant J. D. Rockefeller has parted with all relation
to his former property and has acquired no relation
whatever to the Steel Corporation save as a stockholder holding a small fraction of the stock of that
company.
From the second stipulation it appears that the
later relations of the defendants Rockefeller to
the Steel Corporation were of the most limited
description. Both of them were elected directors
of the Steel Corporation ; the defendant J. D.
Rockefeller remained such until February 2, 1904,
a trifle less than three years, during which period
he was not a member of any committee and never
attended a meeting of the Board. He then resigned.

.
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The defendant J. D. Rockefeller, Junior, was never a
member of any committee, and resigned as a director
March 1, 1910.
Furthermore, and most significantly, it is stipulated by the Government "that
neither of the said defendants since their respective
resignations as aforesaid has had part in the management of the affairs of said Steel Corporation."
While the defendants Rockefeller were not formally
examined as witnesses, the Government has had the
benefit of a searching of their c<imsciences by means of
the elaborate verified stipulation of February 6, 1914.
From this sec@nd stipulation we gather that the only
further relation of these defendants t0 the Steel Corporation was as investors. They personally had no relation t0 the management and their investments give
no hint of management. Acquiring a quantity of stock
in April, 1901, the defendant J. D. Rockefeller had
sold all of it, both preferred and common, by July 8,
1908, and for some time thereafter owned no stock of
the Steel Corporation. His present holding is but
7,101 shares 0f preferred and 23,700 shares of comm@n
st0ck out of 3,602,811 shares of preferred and
5,083,025 shares of common stock, representing less
than one-fifth 0f one per cent. of the outstanding preferred stock and less than 0ne-hal£ of one per cent. of
the autstanding common stock, and he daes not now
own and has not within ten years past owned
any stock in any of the forty or more canstituent
companies of the Steel Corporation named in the
Government Petition (pp. 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45 and
46), and he owns the investment bonds of the Steel
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Corporation and of a few of its constituent companies
set forth in the short table appearing in the stipulation. The holdings 0f the defendant J. D. Rockefeller, Junior, have been and are entirely negligible
(see Stipulation).
It thus appears, through the conclusive stipulation
of the Government, that neither of these defendants
has, at any rate since March 1, 1910, had part in the
management of the affairs of the 8teel C0rporati0n or
had any such stock or bondholding as to indicate the
slightest c0ntrol by vote or otherwise over the affairs
of the Corporation.
At the close of the case for the Government the defendants Rockefeller duly moved , for non-suit as
against them (Record, page 3766), and now at the
close of the whole case they renew that motion.

ARGUMENT.
POINT I.
The defendants Rockefeller are not violating
the law or threatening to violate it and were
not violating it or threatening to violate it
when the suit was begun. Failing proof of such
violation or threatened violation no decree can
be entered against them.
(a) The Anti-Trust Act is a criminal statute and

should be interpreted as such even although the proceeding in question is in chancery. In Northern Se-
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curities Company vs. United States, 193 U. S., see
page 401, the Court said, through Mr. Justice
HOLMES:

" The statute of which we have to find the
meaning is a criminal statute. The two sections on which the Government relies both
make certain acts crimes. That is their immediate purpose and that is what they say. It is
vain to insist that this is not a criminal proceeding. The words cannot be read one way
in a suit which is to end in fine and imprisonment and another way in one which seeks an
injunction.''
There are numerous other cases to the same effect.
(b) The case at bar is brought under ·section 4 of
the Anti-Trust Act. Other sections provide for punishment for past offences ; this one provides for restraint of a continuing offence; other sections provide for the past, this for the future. We quote from
Section 4:
" The several Circuit C0urts @f the United
States are hereby invested with jurisdiction to
prevent and restrain violations of this Act;
and it shall be the duty * * * to institute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such violations. Such proceedings may
be by way of petition setting forth the case
and praying that such violations shall be enjoined or otherwise prohibited * * *
Pending such petition and before final decree
the Court may at any time make such temporary restraining order or prohibition as shall
be deemed just in the premises."
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The language is wholly preventive and prospective;
and this accords with the fundamental idea Qf an injunction. The Supreme Court has said :
" The functien of an injunction is to afford
preventive relief, not to redress alleged wrongs
which have been committed already."
Lacassagne vs. Chapius, 144 U. S., see
p. 124;
and this Ceurt has so held in a proceeding under Section 4.
" There can be no injunctive relief granted
unless it tends ta restrain some specific future
or continuing violation of the act."
United States vs. Reading Co., 183 Fed.,
seep. 459.
There is no Anti-Trust case where the bill was not
. dismissed as against individual defendants net shown
to have real connection at the time of the filing of the
bill with the continuance of the combination or restraint of trade complained of. The cases show that
it is not enough that a defendant had relation to the
combination at the time of its inception; he must
be shown to have a relation of management or control at the time_of the filing of the petition. Injunctions were granted against individual defendants in
the Northern Securities case, the Oil case, the Tobacco
case, the Harvester case, but in each of these the
Court found that the individuals in question were
themselves principal actors and in the Tobacco case,
for instance, found that the corporations were merely
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corporate forms for the activities of the individuals in
question, and it being shown that the corporations
were continuing the combination the individuals were
enjoined.
(c) On the other hand, in the cases where there
was failure of the Government to show participation
by the individuals in question in the continuance of
the combination at the time of the commencement of
the suit, the Government has failed as against them;
even although it had been shown that the individuals joined in the original conspiracy, it was enough
that they had retired from it and were not now
continuing in it. A conspirator may retire from a
conspiracy, and not be responsible for the continuance of it by others. In United States vs. Kissel,
218 U.S., 601, at pp. 607, 608, the Court said, by Mr.
Justice HoLMEs :
" When the plot contemplates bringing topa8s a continmms result that will not continue
without the continuous c0-operation of the C(i)nspirat0rs to keep it up, and there is such c0ntinuous co-operation, there. is a continuing conspiracy."

In Ware vs. United States, 154 Fe~., 577, the Circuit Court of Appeals (Judge
(p. 579):

SANBORN

writing), said

"There is a locus penitentiae after the performance of each ove1·t act and a presumption
of the innocence of the defendant, and if, after
the performance of the :first overt act, a de-
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fendant abandons the design of the conspiracy,
and the prosecution of the conspiracy and of
the first overt act becomes barred by the
statute, the overt acts of other conspirators
within the three years in the performance of
the old conspiracy without the conscious participation of the defendant ought not to charge,
and cannot charge him with the offense, because they fail to evidence his intent to violate
the law within the three years."
To the same effect is United States vs. Raley, 173
Fed., 159 (see p. 167).
(d) In the most recent and most important AntiTrust cases it has been held that the bill will be dismissed wherever there is a failure of proof that the
defendants in question were at the time of the filing
0£ the bill engaged in the operation or carrying out of
the combination. In Standard Oil Co. vs. United
States, 221 U. S., 1, it was said by Mr. Chief Justice
WHITE, writing for the Court, p. 45 :

" The bill was dismissed as to all other corporate defendants, thirty-three in number, it
being adjudged by section 3 of the decree that
they ' have not been proved to be engaged in
the operation or carrying out of the combination.' "

A marginal note indicates the dismissed ~defendants.
The decree referred to, entered in the Circuit Court, is
printed substantially in full in 17 3 Federal, p. 19 7, and
an examination of the full record of theJcase)hows
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that there were no other pertinent recitals than those
printed in the Federal Reporter.
In the decree thus printed, section 1 adjudicates
that in and prior ~o 1899 there were twenty corporati@ns engaged in commerce among the states, etc. ;
that since the year 1890 the defendants named in section 2, " have entered int@ and are carrying out a
combination," etc. ; "that this combination or conspiracy is a combination or conspiracy . in restraint of
trade," etc.
Section 2 decrees that certain named defendants
"united with the Standard Company and other defendants to form and effectuate this combination, and
since its formation have been and still are engaged in
carrying it into effect and continuing it"; that certain named corp@rations " have entered into and became parties to this combination and are either actively
operating or aiding in the operation of it; that by
means of this combination the defendants named in
this section have combined * * * and are continuing to monopolize," etc.
Section 3 decrees that the defendants Argand Refining Company and thirty-two others "have not been
proved ta be engaged in the operation @r caITying out
@f the c@mbination, and the bill is dismissed as against
each of them."
The injunctive relief granted by subsequent sections is confined to the defendants named in Section 2.
In the Tobacc@ case, United States against American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S., 106, the Supreme Court
reversed that part of the decree below which had dis-
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missed the petition as to certain individual defendants.
It is clear that the Supreme Court considered that the
individual defendants were leading actors not only in
the establishment but also in the present continuance
of the combination, although in the part of the
opinion referring to this particular matter (p. 185) the
Court does not stop to amplify the reasons which led it
to that conclusion. In fact, the individual defendants,
James B. Duke and others, were, at the time the petition was :filed, the principal officers, directors and
agents of the Tobacco Company. It is so charged in
the petition (Record in Tobacco case in U. S. Supreme
Court, Vol. I., p. 11) ; the assignments of error upon
which the Government_secured reversal of this part of
the decree below charge as error the failure and refusal
" to find and declare that each and every defendant
had entered into and is now a party to contracts
* * * in restraint of trade and commerce among
the several states," etc. (Record in Tobacco case, Vol.
I., p. 339); and the evidence showed that James B.
Duke, for instance, had been President of the Tobacco
Company from the beginning and was such at the
time of the :filing of the petition (Record in Tobacco
case, Vol. IV., p. 331), and the like is true of all the
other individual defendants.
The Oil case was decided May 15, I 911; the Tobacco case was decided May 29, 1911. Soon afterward, June 21, 1911, was decided the Powder Trust
case, United States against E. I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 188 Fed., 127. The opinion was
written by Circuit Judge LANNING, and concurred
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rn by Circuit Judges GRAY and BUFFINGTON. It
was there expressly decided that relief will be
granted against an individual defendant only when
the defendant is proved to have been violating the
law or threatening to violate it when suit was brought;
and this notwithstanding earlie1 participation in the
c0mbination. The opinion first states the doctrine
and then applies it to the detailed circumstances of
several di:fferent defendants, and dismisses the bill as
to all of the fifteen defendants in question. The Court
said (pp. 129, 132, 133):
" The case, as we view it, is to be decided
upon evidence about which there is practically
no dispute. Our task is by a study of unimpeached documentary and other evidence to
ascertain (1) what were the relations of the defendants when this suit was commenced; (2)
whether those relations are inimical to the
law; and, if so, (3) what the relief shall be.
That task will be simplified if, in the first place,
we determine wl1ich of the defendants are
clearly shown to have had no connection at the
time of the commencement of this suit with any
combination or conspiracy of the nature described in the petition; for, as the only relief
we can grant in this proceeding is injunctive,
the petition must be dismissed as to any defendant who was not violating the law, or
threatening to violate it, when the suit was
commenced. One may be indicted for a former
connecti@n with a combination or conspiracy
violative of the anti-trust act; but, after he has
in good faith withdrawn from such a combina-
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tion or conspiracy, he is no longer a subject of
the injunctive power of a court of equity.

*

*

*

*

*

" Henry A. du Pont is one of the individual
defendants. Previous to 1902 he had frequently represented E. I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co. at the meetings of the Gunpowder Trade
Association. In 1902 he sold the major part
of his interest in that compap_y to other members 0f the du Pont family, though he acted
for a time thereafter as an officer of two of the
du Pont corporations. In June, 1906, more
than a year before this suit was begun, he resigned all his official positions in the defendant
corporations, and since that time has had
neither real nor nominal connection with the
management of any of the defendant corporations, er with any trade agreement or combination concerning the manufacture or sale of
explosives of any kind. His stockholdings in
the defendant corp0ration, after February,
1902, were cemparatively small, and as, after
June 8, 1906, he was not a director er officer
in any of them, and took no part in the management of any of them, he cannot be held
individually responsible for the unlawful acts,
if any there were, of any corp0ration of which
he was a stockholder. It was impossible for
him alone to dominate the business of any of
the defendant corp0rations. There is no evidence that he attempted to do so, or that, after
June 8, 1906, he had any connection, direct or
indirect, with the shaping of policies or the
management of the business of any of them. At
the time 0£ commencing this suit he was doing
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nothing, nor was he threatening to do anything,
which furnishes the subject-matter of injunctive relief as against him.
" Henry F. Baldwin is another individual
defendant, who, it is alleged by the United
States, was, at the time of the filing of the
petition, a director of one of the du Pont companies and one of the managers of its business.
By his answer Baldwin avers that he was a director of the company mentioned for some time
previous to June 14, 1907, but that on that day
he resigned, and has not since been a director
of, or in any way interested in the management
or control of, any of the defendant corp@rations. There is no proof that his answer is
incorrect, or that any injunction should be
granted as against him.

*

*

*

*

*

" For the reasons stated, we think it is clear
that the petition should be dismissed as to the
following fifteen defendants : Aetna Powder
Company, Miami Powder Company, American
Powder Mills, Equitable Powder Manufacturing Company, Austin Powder Company, King
Powder Company, Anthony Powder Company,
Limited, American E. C. & Schultze Gunpowder
C0mpany, Peyton Chemical Company, Henry A.
du Pont, Henry F. Baldwin, California Powder
Works, Conemaugh Powder Company, Metropolitan Powder · Company, and E. I. du Pont
Company of August 1, 1903."
The facts with respect to the defendant Henry A.
duPont are more extreme than anything that can be
asserted by the Government against the defendants
Rockefeller. Colonel duPont was a member of the
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Delaware partnership of E. I. duPont de Nemours &
Company existing prior t0 the combinati0n of 1902.
That partnership had Ieng been in combination with
other firms and corporations through the medium of the
Gunpowder Trade Association. Colenel duPont had
"frequently" represented his firm at meetings of the
Association (188 Fed., 134). This firm, in which he
continued a partner, continued its relation of combination with others through the so-called ''Fundamental
Agreement" of December, 1889. The "principal
parties" were bis firm and two c0rporations (p. 137),
and these continued in active operation of the combination (pp. 138, 139). Colonel duPont was an incorporator and director of the Delaware Company of E. I.
duPont de Nemoms& Company, formed in 1899, which
further continued the combination. In 1902 another
corporation of the same name was formed. "For
thirty years trade agreements had been in existence, in
every one of which the duPonts were active parties"
(p. 140) * * * "The Association of manufacturers of powder and other explosives had probably
never heen stro~ger than it was in February, 1902,
when the change in the management of the duPont
works took place. It had for years arbitrarily fixed
prices in different parts of the United States, waging a
disastrous warfare against competitors until they were coerced int0 terms satisfactory to the A ss0ciati on or brought
into the Association " (p. 140). At this time Colonel
duPont sold '' the major part of his interest to other
members of the duPont family", who continued as
members of the combination. He himself, after the
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formation of the latest phase of the combination and
his sale of the major part of his stock, continued to
act for some years as an officer of two of the duPont
corporations.
When suit was brought he was still a stockholder,
although his holdings were comparatively small. The
decisive facts were that "more than a year'' before
suit was brought he resigned all official positions in
the defendant corporations and since that time bad
had neither real nor nominal connection with the
management or with trade agreements or combinations. " It was impossible for him alone to dominate
the business. There is no evidence that he attempted
to do so, or that at the time suit was brought, he had
any connection with the shaping of policies," etc. The
Comt concluded that '' at the time of commencing
this suit he was doing nothing, nor was he threatening to do anything, which furnishes the subject matter of injunctive relief as against him.''
In the case at bar the most that can be asserted
against the defendants Rockefeller is this : In March,
1901, J. D. Rockefeller owned twenty-five-twentyninths of an ore company and all of a steamship
company; he had no relation to the organization of
the Steel Corporation; he simply sold to it his ore
and vessel interests, receiving payment partly in
cash and, ultimately, partly in stock; he was a
nominal director of the Steel Corporation for
three years, retiring seven years before the filing
of the Government petition, and has not held more
than one-half of one per cent. of the Corporation's.
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stock. J. D. Rockefeller, Jr., had no relation to the
organization of the Steel Corporation ; he s@ld it
nothing; was a director until March 24th, 1910, a
year and a half before the filing of the Government
Petition; his interest in the Steel Corporation is
negligible. The Government stipulates " that neither
of the said defendants since their respective resignations as aforesaid has had part in the management of
the affairs of said Steel Corpora.tion."
In the recent Harvester case-United States vs.
International Harvester Company, 214 Fed., 987all the defendants were enjoined on the ground
that they were all participating in the combination
at the time the suit was hrought. Judge SANBORN,
in a dissenting opinion, urged that none of the
defendants was violating the statute at the time
the suit was brought ; he thought that although
a combination may originally have been formed
rn violation of the statute it conducted its
business thereafter with such fairness and so encouraged c@mpetition that no violation of the statute
was continuing when the petition was filed. A sharp
distinction exists between a defendant who is still
party to the original combination at the time the bill
is filed, whatever may be the manner in which its business is then conducted, and a defendant who at the
time the bill is filed is not a party to or participating
in the combination in any manner: the former is the
Harvester case; the latter is our case. We are not
called upon to inquire into the manner in which the
Steel Corporation was conducting its business at the
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time the bill was · :filed. In truth, the defendants
Rockefeller were not parties to the original combination, if any; but even if it could be held that they
were, it is indisputable that they had withdrawn from
it, and that when the bill was filed they had no relati0n to the Steel Corporation or to its operation in the
trade.
In determining the disposition to he made of the
petition as to the defendants Rockefeller, the nature
of the offense aimed at by the statute, as set forth in
sections 1 and 2, and the · remedy provided by section
4 are vital considerations. Contract, combination, or
conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce, or monopolization of trade or commerce, are the offenses denounced by the statute. A double remedy is afforded
for the violation of the statute. The penal remedy
refers only to past action and with it we are not concerned. The civil remedy refers to future action and
rests wholly upon Section 4.
A decree for disso1 ution of the Steel C@rporation is not
applicable to the defendants Rockefeller as they have
no power over the corporate defendants, and have no
authority to participate in the dissolution of the corporate defendants if a decree for that purpose were
entered.
A decree restraining the conduct of the defendants
Rockefeller themselves is the remedy, if any, applicable to those defendants, and it is the remedy prayed
for in the petition. An injunction, 1f issued, in effect
would direct the defendants Rockefeller to depart
from their present conduct and to cease their present
violation or threatened violation of the statute. The
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time the bill was filed. In truth, the defendants
Rockefeller were not parties to the original combination, if any; but even if it could be held that they
were, it is indisputable that they had withdrawn from
it, and that when the bill was filed they had no relati0n t0 the Steel C0rporation or to its operation in the
trade.

[Insert on page 24, at close of first paragraph.]

Since the printing 0£ this brief, a decision has been
handed down, October 13, 1914, in the Steamship
case (United States v. Hamburg-American Steamship
Line, et al.) by the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York, Circuit Judges
LACOMBE, CoXE, WARD and RoGERS sitting and concuITing. While denying the main contention of the
Government, the Court orders an injunction against
the use of "fighting ships," with the important qualification that the bill is dismissed as against defendants
who had retired from the '· fighting ship" agreement
before the filing of the bill. Judge LACOMBE, writing
for the Court, said :
" The Allan Line and Canadian Pacific
Line with<h-ew from the 'fighting ship ' agreement before the bill was filed. As to both
these defendants the bill is dismissed. As to
the other defendants injunction will issue
against the continuance 0£ the 'fighting ships.' "
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evidence establishes c@nclusively that the defendants
Rockefeller were not violating er threatening to violate the statute at the time the suit was begun, and
that they are not violating or threatening to violate
the statute at the present time. The evidence informs
the court that an injunction against the defendants
Rockefeller is completely unnecessary, and that their
conduct is entirely in accordance with the reqmrements of the statute.
An injunction will not issue merely because it has
been asked for and if issued may n0t injure the defendants. In Teller vs. United States, 113 Fed., 463,
Judge A.DA.MS, writing for the Circuit Court of Appeals
in the Eighth Circuit, in disposing of the argument
that the injunction if issued would not injure the
defendant, said:
" It is n@t sufficient that such an order will
do no harm. It should at least ,be,, made to ap-

LInsert at end of page 25.]

~

'"

The recent legislation (Clayton Anti-Trust Act of
Octo_ber 15, 1914, Section 5), giving entirely new evidential value to decrees in government anti-trust cases
would apply to a decree in favor of the Govern.men~
in this suit and, especially in connection with Section
4 of the same Act and Section 7 of the Sherman Act
providing for triple damage suits, adds a new an~
grave objection to a decree against an individual defend~nt except in cases where the facts clearly warrant it and present or imminent acts of the defendant
certainly demand it.
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evidence establishes c0nclusively that the defendants
Rockefeller were not violating er threatening to vio1ate the statute at the time the suit was begun, and
that they are not violating or threatening to violate
the statute at the present time. The evidence informs
the court that an injunction against the defendants
Rockefeller is completely unnecessary, and that their
conduct is entirely in accordance with the reqmrements of the statute.
An injunction will not issue merely because it has
been asked for and if issued may n0t injure the defendants. In Teller vs. United States, 113 Fed., 463,
Judge ADAMS, writing for the Circuit Court of Appeals
in the Eighth Circuit, in disposing of the argument
that the injunction if issued would not injure the
defendant, said :

"It is n0t sufficient that such an order will
do no harm. It should at least be made to appear that it would do some good.''
Cited with approval in Weir vs. Winnett, 155 Fed.,
824, 827.
In c<1msidering the same · questi0n in International
Register Co. vs. Recording Fare Register Co., 151.
Fed., 199, 202, Judge · TOWNSEND, speaking for the
Circuit Court of Appeals 0£ the Second Circuit, said:

"It is not sufficient ground for an injunction
that @bedience to it will not hurt defendants.
Nor is it any answer to the assignments of error
by the defendants that 'there is nothing in the
injunction that w0uld interfere with an honest
man c0nducting his business unhindered by any
restrictian '."
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POINT II.
The defendants Rockefeller were not parties
to the promotion of the United States Steel
Corporation. The Plan for assembling certain
plants was originated and carried out by
others. After the Plan had been consummated,
John D. Rockefeller at the request of the Steel
Corporation sold his ore and vessel properties
and the Steel Corporation purchased and paid
for them. It was a sale of property to the Corporation by an outsider.

(a) Something is said in the Government brief
(Part I., p. 351, ff.) of the considerable interest of the
defendants Rockefeller in ore properties prior to the
organization of the Steel Corporation in 1901, and of
alleged relations of what the Government brief calls
the "Rockefeller interests" with other "interests."
But even if these assertions and intimations were true
they would in no sense be comparable with the relation found by the Court to have existed between
Henry A. du Pont and the Powder combination, and
we perceive that all of this assertion amounts to nothing
when we discover (a,) that the Govemment in its brief
does not even ask for a decree adjudging the Rockefeller companies to have been combinations or that
they had entered into combinati0ns in restraint of
trade, and (b) that every conceivable relation of the
defendants Rockefeller to these companies ceased in
1901 upon the sale to the Steel Corporation.
(b) The defendants Rockefeller were not promoters
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of the United States Steel Corporation. They did not
conceive the idea of bringing the properties together;
they were not consulted as to the properties to be assembled or purchased, nor as to the method or price of
acquisition, nor as to the capitalization or organization
of the Corporation; they di.d not aid in any manner in
bringing the properties together under the Plan either
by negotiation for purchase or otherwise; they were
not parties to any syndicate or underwriting agreement; in no way did they aid in the :flotation of the
securities of the Steel Corporation; they received no
profits from any syndicate or underwriting agreement.
Other persons were the promoters and conceived and
carried out the plan. Judge Gary in his testimony
reviews with much detail the manner in which these
properties were assembled (Record, pp. 4747-4749);
he names the persons who actively took part in the
work, and he describes the properties which were considered necessary to the consummation of the Plan ;
the defendants Rockefeller are not included among
those _persons and their properties are not included
among those properties ; Judge Gary's evidence
clearly shows that the defendants Rockefeller were
outsiders. The Plan contemplated the assembling of
certain plants and after this had been consummated
the Corporation decided to obtain, if possible, certain
additional ore and vessel properties belonging principally to John D. Rockefeller. The sale of the Rockefeller properties was negotiated as a cash transaction ;
only later was it agreed that stock should be taken
and only for a part of the property; the vessel prop-
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erty was paid for in cash; the ore property in stock.
John D. Rockefeller as an outsider, at the request of
the Steel Corporation, sold his preperties to it ; he
sold them without condition of any kind as to their
use, or as to the future business policy of the purchaser; there was no agreement of any kind between the seller and the purchaser after the sale of
the property and payment for it. This was a sale in
substance as well as in form; if John D. Rockefeller
by this sale became a party to the combination, if
combinati0n there was, then every person who sold
property to the Steel Corporation in 1901 by virtue
of such sale became a party to the combination.
While John D. R0ckefeller became a director of the
Steel C@rporation, it was no condition of the sale
that he should be made a director, and in fact he
never attended a meeting and was not a member of a
c@mmittee at any time; he was at most a nominal
director, and resigned more than seven years before
suit was brought.
John D. Rockefeller, Junior, became a director of
the company; he, however, had sold n0 property; his
stockholding was trifling, and his only relation to the
company was that of director, which position he resigned a year and a half before the :filing of the Government petition.
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Recapitulation.
I.

Pleadings.

No cause of action is alleged.
(a) 1901.-In a general omnibus clause it is stated,
but as a conclusion only, that defendants Rockefeller
participated in the alleged combination in 1901, but no
fact is pleaded to sustain this conclusion. It is pleaded
that the Steel Corporation acquired from the defendants Rockefeller the stock of the Lake Superior Company and of the Bessemer Company; that payment
was made partly in cash and partly in stock of the
Steel Corporation, and that defendants Rockefeller
became members of the first Board of Directors. This
pleading is quite consistent with the fact that defendants Rockefeller were vendors, not promoters.
(b) 1911.-Even if the facts pleaded showed that
defendants Rockefeller were in 1901 not vendors but
participants in the Plan, there is complete failure to
allege facts sh@wing that defendants Rockefeller continued a relation of management or control in the
Steel Corporation when the Government bill was filed
in October, 1911. It cannot be presumed as matter
of pleading that facts alleged to have existed in 1901
continued to exist in 1911.
On the face of the bill, therefore, it does not appear
that defendants Rockefeller were participants in the
Plan of February, 1901, nor that, even if they were
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such participants, they continued a relation of management to the Steel Corporati0n at the time the petition was filed in October, 1911.
II.

The Proofs.

The Government has offered no proof of any violation of the statute by the defendants Rockefeller.
(a) 1901. The evidence and the stipulations with
the Government establish that the defendants Rockefeller had no part in the formation of the Steel Corporation ; they were not consulted as to capitalizati0n, organization, properties or prices ; the Plan had
been consummated before any offer was made to them.
The transaction when effected was not only in form
but in very substance a sale. Defendant J. D. Rockefeller was an outsider; he merely sold his property tothe Steel Corporation. J. D. Rockefeller, Junior, was
not even a vendor, much less a prom0ter.
(b) 1911. There is absence of proof that defendants
Rockefeller were participating in the management of
the Steel Co1poration or in any alleged combination in
October, 1911, when the Government petition was filed.
More, there is positive proof by stipulation to the
contrary! It is stipulated with the Government that,
at least since March, 1910, defendants Rockefeller
have had no part in the management of the Corporation and that the largest stockholding of J. D. Rockefeller at any time since March, 1910, has been less
than one-fifth of one per cent. of the preferred stock
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and less than one-half 0£ one per cent. 0£ the common
stock. The etockholding 0£ the defendant J. D. Rockefeller, Junior, has been negligible. J. D. Rockefeller has never had any relation to the management,
save that from 1901 to 1904 he was a merely nominal
director; J. D. Rockefeller, Junior, ceased to be a
director a year and a half before petition filed.
It was well said by this Court in the Powder case :
" As the only relief we can grant in this
proceeding is injunctive, the petition must be
dismissed as to any defendant who was not
violating the law or threatening to violate it
when the suit was commenced."

POINT III.
The petition should be dismissed as to the
defendants Rockefeller.

& HowLAND,
Solicitors for Defendants John D. Rockefeller
and John D. Rockefeller, Junior.
MURRAY, PRF..NTIOE

GEORGE WELWOOD M URRAY,

Of Counsel.
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APPENDIX.
Stipulations Between the United States Government and the Defendants Rockefeller.
First Stipulation-Record, Vol. IX., p. 3888.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES
Fo&

THE DrsTRIOT OF NEw JERSEY.

UNITED STATES OF AMERIOA,

Petiti0ner,
vs.
UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION, ET AL.,

l

I

lN@. 6214.
r

j

Defendants.

Stipulation.

It is stipulated hy and between the petitioner and
the defendants John D. Rockefeller and John D.
Rockefeller, Jr., that in March, 1901, John D. Rockefeller, owning about twenty-five twenty-ninths 0£ the
capital stock (represented by trustees' certificates) of
Lake Superi0r Cons0lidated Iron Mmes, at which time
that company had outstanding capital st0ck 0f the par
value 0f $29,424,594, reached an agreement with J. P.
Morgan & C0mpany, acting f@r United States Steel
Corporation, to sell the stock in said company then
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owned by him to J. P. Morgan & Company, acting for
said Steel Corporation, for a price reckoned on the basis
0f $48,000,000.00, for the total outstanding stock of
said company; that thereafter, and on March 15, 1901,
it was agreed between John D. Rockefeller and J.P.
M0rgan & Company, acting for said Steel C0rporati0n,
that said price for Mr. Rockefeller's stock would be
paid and discharged by delivering to him stock of the
United States Steel Corporation, as follows:
For each share of stock (par value one hundred dollars) of the Lake Superior Consolidated
Iron Mines 1.35 shares of the Preferred stock
of the United States Steel Corporation, and 1.35
shares of the Common stock of the United
States Steel Corporation ;
that at that time the market price in New York City
for said stock of the Steel Corp@ration was eightythree per centum for preferred st@ck and thirty-eight
per centum for common stock, and that J obn D. Rockefeller made it a c@ndition of his sale of any of his
st@ck that said Steel Corp@ration sh@uld immediately
@ffer the same terms to all other stockholders of Lake
Superior Consolidated Iron Mines.
New York, February 28, 1913.
J. M. DICKINSON,
HENRY

E.

COLTON,

BARTON CORNEAU,

Special Assistants to the Attorney.General.

& HOWLAND,
Attorneys far the Defendants J0hn D. Rockefeller
and John D. Rockefeller, Jr.
MURRAY, PRENTIOE
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Second Stipulation-Record, VoL XXVIII.,
p. 12059.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES
FoR THE DisTRIOT OF NEw JERSEY.

uNITED

STATES OF AMERIO A,

Petitioner,

l
I

AGAINST

No. 6214.
UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION, ET AL.,

Defendants.

Stipulation.

It is Stipulated between the petiti0ner and the defendants John D. Rockefeller and John D. Rockefeller, Junior, as between the Petitioner and said defendants in the above cause, and for no other purpose,
as follows:
(1) That on April 6th, 1901, both said defendants
were elected directors of the United States Steel Corporation ; that on February 2nd, 1904, the defendant
J0hn D. Rockefeller resigned as a director of said C0rporation and that his resignation was then accepted ;
that defendant John D. Rockefeller had not attended
any meeting of the Board of Directors of said Corporation and was never a member of any c0mmittee of
the said Board.
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(2) That on March 1, 1910, the defendant J0hn D.
Rockefelle),', Junior, resigned as a director of said Steel
Corporation; that his resignation was then accepted
and that be was never a member of any committee of
the said Board.
(3) That neither of the said defendants, since their
respective resignations as aforesaid, has had part in
the management of the affairs of said Steel Corporation.
(4) That by July 8, 1908, the defendant John D.
Rockefeller had sold all of the stock, preferred and
common, of said Steel Corp@ration received by him in
1901 upon his sale of stock of Lake Superior Consolidated Iron Mines referred to in the Stipulation in this
suit, made between the Government and the defendants Rockefeller, dated February 28, 1913, and on
that day, July 8, 1908, and for some time thereafter,
be owned no stock of said Steel C@rpor~tion, either
preferred or common; that on March 1, 1910 (the
date of the resignation of his son as a director, hereinafter referred to) he owned i,101 shares, and no m0re,
of the preferred stock of the said Corporation, and
18,101 shai·es, and no more, of its common stock;
that at present be owns 2,200 shares, and no m@re,
of preferred stock of said Corporation, and 200 shares,
and no more, of its common stock; and that the largest
number of shares of such stock he has owned in the
period intervening between March 1, 1910, and the
present time is 7,101 shares of preferred stock and
23,700 shares of common stock, out of a present outstanding issue of about 3,602,811 shares of said pre-
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£erred stock and about 5,083,025 shares of said common
stock.
That the defendant, John D. Rockefeller, does not
now own, and has not within ten years past owned
any stock in any of the concerns enumerated as constituent or subsidiary concerns of said Steel Corporation on pages 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45 and 46 of the
Government Petition in this suit; and that said defendant does not own any of the bonds of said Steel
Corporation or said constituent or subsidiary concerns,
except as follows, which h e now holds :
U. 8. Steel Corporation collateral trust
bonds of 1951, of the face value of.. .... $1,398,000
U. 8. Steel Corporation sinking fund 5
per cent. bonds, of the face value of... ..
429,000
Union Steel Co. 1st mortgage bands of
1952, of the face value of... ...............
650,000
Tennessee Coal, Iron and Railroad Co.,
general mortgage 5 per cent. bonds of
1951, of the face value of ............ ..... .
400,000
Illinois Steel Co., debentures of 1940, of
the face value of ... ... .................... ..
500,000
Indiana Steel Co., 1st mortgage bonds of
1952, of the face value of ............... ..
500,000
Duluth, Missabe and Northern Railway
Co. Consolidated 1st mortgage bonds,
of the face value of .......... .. ........ .
145,000
]'irst Divisional bonds, of the face value
966,000
of ........... ...... ................... .. ..... ..
General Mortgage bonds, of the face value
956,000
of ..... .... ..... ........................ ......... .
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(5) That in April, 1901, the defendant John D.
R0ckefellet·, Junior, owned 900 shares, and no more,
of preferred stock of said Steel Corporation, and 7,400
shares, and n@ more, 0£ common stock 0£ said C@rporation; that on March 1, 1910, when he resigned as a·
director 0£ said Corporation, he owned none of the
stock there@£, either preferred 0r common and owns
none at the present time; that the largest number 0f
shares 0£ st0ck of said C@rporation he has owned is
6,700 shares 0f such preferred stock and 21,500 shares of
such common stock; that dming 1906 and 1907 he acquired $15,000, face value, U. S. Steel C0rporati0n
Sinking Fund Bonds ; that he never owned a greater
amount of b@nds 0£ said Corporation and owns none
at the present time; that he has not within ten year~
past owned any stocks 0r any bonds of any of the
constituent concerns 0£ said Steel Corporation enumerated on page 40 of the Government petition in this
suit, n@r of any of the subsidiary companies enumerated on pages 41, 42, 43, 44, 45 and 46 @f said G0vernment petition.
New York, February 6, 1914.
J. M. DICKINSON,
HENRY

E.

COLTON,

Special Assistants to the Attorney-General.
MURRAY, PRENTIOE & HOWLAND,
Solicitors for the Defendants John D.
Rockefeller and John D. Rockefeller, Jr.
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STATE OF NEW YORK, ~
County of Westchester,

ss.:

JOHN D. RocKEFELLER, being duly sworn, says that
the statement of facts contained in the foregoing Stipulation, so far as it relates to him, is true.
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER.
Sworn to before me, this 18th }
day of February, 1914.
[SEAL.]

STATE OF NEW

FREDERICK F. BRIGGS,
Notary Public.

YORK,}

County of New Y0rk,

ss.:

JoHN D. RocKEFELLER, JuNIOR, being duly sworn,
says that the statement of facts contained in the foreg0ing Stipulation, s0 far as it relates to him, is true.
JORN D. ROCKEFELLER, JR.
Sworn to before me, this 17th }
day of February, 1914.
[SEAL.]

HARRY .P. FrsH,
Notary Public,
New Y0rk County No. 1097,
Register No. 5105.

[11985]

THE EVENING POST JOB PRINTING OFFICE,

156

FULTON ST., N. Y.

IN THE

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY.

THE UNITED STATES

)

vs.

~

THE UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORA-,
TION,

et al.

)

ON MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.

MEMORANDUM.

Per Owriam
The Government asks us to restrain the principal
defendant and all its subsidiary companies from destroying books and papers, but without describjng them except in very general terms. No evidence is offered that
such destruction is threatened, and it need hardly be
said that evidence is essential before any man may be
either accused or convicted of what would be in substance a criminal interference with the course of justice.
The motion is supported almost wholly by the fact that
after certain prosecutions in the southern district of New
York came to an end, a number of papers belonging to
the American Steel & Wire Company that had been furnished by the company to the Government for use in such
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prosecutions and had been returned to its possession
were destroyed by one of its officers. While we are satisfied that this destruction was without evil intent, the
fact remains that the destruction di d take place, and we
see no reason why (so far as the Steel & Wire Company
is concerned) the present order should not be continued.
But it is not shown that the other defendants were in
any respect connected with this act, and (so far as, they
are concerned) without evidence we cannot grant the
present petition. It must therefor~ be refused, except
as to the Steel & Wire Company, but the Government has
leave to make a similar motion at any time in the future,
if counsel shall regard such a step as necessary or
desirable.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, l .
District of New Jersey, f ss ·
I, GEORGE T. CRANMER, Clerk pf the District Court
of the United States of America, for the District of New
Jersey, in the Third Circuit, do hereby certify the foregoing to be a true copy of the original Memorandum, on
file, and now remaining among the records of the said
Court, in my office.
IN TES'l'll\lIONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto subscribed
my name and affixed the Seal of the said Court, at
Trenton, in said District, this Thirteenth day of
May nineteen hundred and twelve.
[SEAL]

[94153Q]

GEORGE T. CRANMER,
Clerk District Court, U. S.
By 0. S. CHEVRIER,
Deputy.
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